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COMMENTARIES

STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY*

The Restatement's Treatment of
Sources and Evidence of
International Law
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States is
a "comprehensive revision"' of its predecessor, the original Restatement, 2
which the American Law Institute (ALI) published in 1965. 3 The new version is

*Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Member, International
Law Commission of the United Nations. I am grateful to Professors David Caron, Anthony D'Amato,
Harold Maier, and Don Wallace for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The Chief Reporter for the Restatement (Third) is Professor
Louis Henkin. The Associate Reporters are Professors Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Louis B. Sohn, and
Detlev F. Vagts. Id. at V. The procedure by which Restatements are prepared and adopted by the
American Law Institute is described in id. at XI.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
3. Lawyers trained outside the United States and not familiar with Restatements should be
aware that, despite what their titles might imply, neither Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
represents the official position of the United States Government. The ALl emphasizes that the
Restatement (Third) is " 'in no sense an official document of the United States.' The American Law
Institute is a private organization, not affiliated with the United States Government or any of its
agencies." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, at IX (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 2). Indeed, the ALl notes in the foreword that "[i]n a number of particulars the formulations in
this Restatement are at variance with positions that have been taken by the United States Government." Id. These variations were presumably deliberate, since the ALl extended the Restatement
(Third) project one year beyond its original schedule in part to take into consideration "communications received . . . from the Department of State and from the Justice Department.
...
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS, 63RD ANNUAL MEETING, 1986, at 90 (1987) [hereinafter ALI
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an ambitious undertaking, covering "many more subjects, and reflect[ing] important developments in the intervening decades ...., Like the previous Restatement, its impact may be even greater than that of the Restatements of other
subjects, due to the relative lack of familiarity of the American bench and bar
with international law. The likelihood that lawyers in the United States will rely
heavily upon the Restatement (Third), coupled with the increasing frequency
with which practice in this country assumes a transnational dimension, makes
this a particularly important Restatement.
Despite appearances created by the arcane system of the ALI, the Restatement
(Third) is actually a revision of the first Restatement to deal with the foreign
relations law of the United States. The previous Restatement did not address the
sources of international law in black letter; in that volume the ALI relegated
coverage of this fundamental topic to the comments to section 1,6 which defines
"international law." 7 This review article examines the manner in which the new
Restatement deals with the sources of international law and related subjects. It
does so more from a practical than a theoretical perspective, 8 and due to space
constraints, does not attempt a detailed study of the Restatement (Third)'s treatment of these matters.
One of the considerations motivating the ALL to prepare a revised and expanded Restatement was that "[f]urther experience has suggested . . . the desirability of guidance in matters not likely to be familiar to the average lawyer, for
example, the sources of international law . . . ."9This rationale for covering the
sources of international law in the Restatement (Third) raises the question
whether the ALl has achieved the goal it implicitly set for itself: providing
"guidance" to the "average lawyer" on the subject of sources, since it is a
matter "not likely to be familiar" to the nonspecialist. The material examined is
assessed in part from this perspective. Before turning to the relevant sections of
the Restatement (Third) however, several general points merit brief comment.
PROCEEDINGS]. The Foreign Relations Restatements could, in fact, be used as authority against the
U.S. Government or American nationals as, for instance, in proceedings before the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal.
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,at 3.

5. In an asterisked footnote to the foreword, the ALI explains that while the working title of the
project was "Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)," the designation "Restatement Third" was ultimately adopted to signify that the work "is in the generation of
Restatements forthcoming since the Restatements Second." Id. at IX. The original Foreign Relations
Restatement was actually designated the "Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States." It "was called the Restatement (Second) not to distinguish it from a Restatement
(First), (there is no Restatement (First)), but to indicate that it was part of the second series of
restating efforts by the ALl." Maier, Remarks, The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, Revised: How Were the Controversies Resolved?, AM. Soc'y INT'L L., PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 81ST ANNUAL MEETING 180 (1990).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § I comment c.

7. Id. § 1;this section is set forth infra in text at note 16.
8. For a more theoretical view of Restatement (Third), see Falk, Conceptual Foundations, 14
YALE J. INT'L L. 439 (1989).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,at 4.
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I. General Considerations
Any effort to evaluate the Restatement (Third) must begin with a determination of what it is that the ALl has set out to restate. The answer to this question
may appear obvious from the title of the work, but a closer look raises questions
about the extent to which the title accurately describes the contents. Section 1 of
Restatement (Third) defines the "foreign relations law of the United States" as
consisting of:
(a) international law as it applies to the United States; and
(b) domestic law that has substantial significance for the foreign relations of
0
the United States or has other substantial international consequences.1
One might first inquire whether "international law" is properly contrasted with
the "domestic law" of the United States, in view of Justice Gray's ringing
declaration in The PaqueteHabana that "[i]nternational law is part of our [U.S.]
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.""
If international law is in fact part of U.S. domestic law, then it is certainly an
element of the foreign relations law of the United States. But by "international
law" does the ALl mean the customary and treaty law that has been ascertained
and administered by U.S. courts? 12 Or, assuming for purposes of analysis that
there may be some differences, does it contemplate the law that would be applied
by an international tribunal or that would be generally agreed upon by the
international community as a whole? The Introduction to the Restatement (Third)
provides the following answer to that question:
In restating international law, this Restatement maintains the conception and follows the
method of the previous Restatement. As the Reporters of the previous Restatement
said . . .: [t]he positions or outlooks of particular states, including the United States,
should not be confused with what a consensus of states would accept or support. Like
the previous Restatement, this Restatement represents the opinion of The American
Law Institute as to the rules that an impartial tribunal would
13 apply if charged with

deciding a controversy in accordance with international law.
For the purposes of the Restatement (Third), therefore, "international law" is
not necessarily what an American court would ascertain and administer, but
rather "what a consensus of states would accept or support," or phrased another
way, "the rules that an impartial tribunal would apply."
It is thus possible that in referring to the "foreign relations law of the United
States," the title of the Restatement (Third), like that of its predecessor, could be
somewhat misleading. "International law" as ascertained and administered by

10. Id. § 1.
11.
12.
17 and
13.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
That term is defined in § 101, but the definition does not answer our question. See infra note
accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, at 3.

SUMMER 1991

314

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

U.S. courts may in fact differ in material respects from that which would be

ascertained and applied by an international tribunal, whether it be the International Court of Justice or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. While the Reporters' Notes
to the Restatement (Third) make frequent reference to U.S. case law, implying
that it is in significant part the basis of the rules stated in black letter, the lawyer
should bear in mind, when referring to the Restatement (Third), that it does not
generally set forth U.S. law per se, t4 but purports to reflect rules that "a
consensus of states would accept or support." 15
The reference to "international law" in the definition of "foreign relations
law" quoted above leads to a second general point: What is encompassed within
the term "international law" as used in the Restatement (Third)? The previous
Restatement defined "international law" as follows: " 'International law,' as
used in the Restatement of this Subject, means those rules of law applicable to
a state or international organization that cannot be modified unilaterally by it." 16
To its credit, the Restatement (Third) adopts a broader definition, which recognizes that the subjects of international law are not only states and international
organizations, but also individuals and juridical persons. That definition is found
in section 101, which provides as follows: "International law, as used in this
Restatement, consists of rules and principles of general application dealing with
the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations
inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or
juridical." 17

The Comments to section 101 of the Restatement (Third) make clear that the
term "international law" refers to public international law, although they recognize that "[t]he concepts, doctrines, and considerations that inform private
international law also guide the development of some areas of public international law .... 18 The Restatement (Third) adds the term "principles" to its
14. The ALl does attempt, however, to identify significant differences between international law
and U.S. law where they exist and designates as "Law of the United States" those "[r]ules or
principles that are not international law applicable to states generally, but . . . are part of the domestic law of the United States.
...
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,Introduction at 5.
15. Id. at 3 (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 2, at xii). In light of this standard,
one might inquire what is added by the words "as it applies to the United States" in § I (a). Those
words presumably refer to the way in which general rules apply to the United States, rather than
indicating that the Restatement only deals with international law insofar as it applies specifically and
directly to the United States.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 1.
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 101.

18. Id. comment c. Somewhat curiously, the Comments to § 101 seem to assume that the
designations "public international law" and "private international law" are unknown, or at least
little used in the United States: "International law, which in most other countries is referred to as
Ipublic international law,' is often distinguished from private international law (called conflict of laws
in the United States)." Id. While it is true that the appellations "international law" and "conflict of
laws" are generally used in American law school curricula, the terms public and private international
law have gained some currency. For example, the Department of State has Advisory Committees on
Public and Private International Law.
VOL. 25, NO. 2
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definition, but offers no explanation, in section 101 itself or in the Comments, of
what is meant by that term or whether the ALl intends to draw a distinction
between "rules" and "principles." Possibly the ALI has in mind the kinds of
general principles of law that the International Court of Justice has described as
"well established" or "well known," such as the principle that "no one may be
judge in his own cause" 19 or that a judgment "is res judicata and has binding
force between the parties to the dispute. ' 20 Other such general principles may
include "good faith, abuse of rights, retroactivity, the obligation to repair a
wrong, the territoriality of criminal law, acquiescence, and estoppel." 2' The term
"principles" as used in section 101 could also refer to fundamental principles of
international law, such as the peaceful settlement of disputes, pacta sunt servanda, and the sovereign equality of states.
A third general point concerns the manner in which rules are stated. One of the
great virtues of the Restatements is that they set forth rules in a clear and concise
manner. However, clarity is a virtue only insofar as it is not misleading. The
student of international law is struck by the confidence and simplicity with which
a number of the rules in the Restatement (Third) are stated, 22 which sometimes
conveys the impression that the rules are rigid and undisputed. One wonders
whether this approach well serves the average American lawyer or judge, who
will probably be far better equipped to evaluate and intelligently utilize a Restatement of the law of, for example, contracts, than of international law.
A fourth general observation concerns another sense in which the Restatement
may present an oversimplified view of international law, namely, that the black
letter and commentary often leave the impression that the body of norms making
up the field is relatively static rather than dynamic. As Professor Falk has commented, "at a time of tension and turmoil in international life, the Restatement's
view of foreign relations law conveys a misleadingly ultra-stable image of the
subject matter." 2 3 Indeed, the ceding of aspects of sovereignty and independence
by states in Western Europe and the assertions of sovereignty and independence
by states, nations, and republics in Eastern Europe portend fundamental changes
in contemporary ideas about international law. Regardless of whether one views
the present era as being more or less stable than others, the conceptualization of

19. Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 32.
20. Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
1954 I.C.J. 47, 53 (emphasis in original).
21.

Virally, The Sources of International Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 116,

148 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968).
22. To cite only a few examples, see §§ 203(2), 207, 223, 451, 601(2), and 602(2). This does
not apply to all sections of the Restatement (Third), of course. Section 403, on "Limitations on
Jurisdiction to Prescribe," is an example of a provision that, because of its complexity and flexibility,
may go too far in the other direction.
23. Falk, supra note 8, at 441. To the same effect with particular reference to Part VI of
Restatement (Third), The Law of the Environment, see Caron, The Law of the Environment: A
Symbolic Step of Modest Value, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 528 (1989).
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general international law as an ongoing and constantly unfolding process is not
accorded the prominence it deserves. 24 Professor McDougal, the principal exponent of this view, has suggested that "international law be regarded not as
mere rules, but as a whole process of authoritative decision in the world
arena .
,,.25
In an article discussing the law of the sea, Professor McDougal
offered a description of customary law relating to that field, which applies more
generally and has since been frequently quoted. According to this characterization, customary international law is
not a mere static body of rules but ... rather a whole decision-making process .... It is,
inother words, a process of continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response, in
which the decision-makers of particular nation states unilaterally put forward claims of the
most diverse and conflicting character ...and in which other decision-makers, external to
the demanding state.., weigh and appraise these competing claims in terms of the interests of the world community and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject
them. As such a process, it is a living, growing law, grounded in the practices and sanctioning expectations of nation-state officials, and changing as their demands and expectations are changed by the exigencies of new interests
and technology and by other contin26
ually evolving conditions in the world arena.
This view of the way in which international law functions will probably not make
the practitioner's life much easier, since it does not correspond to orthodox
conceptions of law or the process of law formation. It could, however, enrich the
practitioner's understanding of the field and the manner in which it evolves and
thus result in more effective advocacy.
A fifth and final matter of general significance concerns the roles played by
Comments and Reporters' Notes in the Restatement (Third). In general, Comments to sections of other Restatements (including the original Foreign Relations
Restatement) contain explanations of the black letter rules, together with illustrations of the way in which the rules would apply in concrete fact situations,
while Reporters' Notes in those Restatements briefly set forth citations of authority relied upon by the reporters in formulating the black letter rules and
Comments.
24. The following appears in the Introductory Note to Part I, Chapter One, "International Law:
Character and Sources:"
Customary international law has developed slowly and unevenly, out of action and reaction in practice, rather than
systematically or by major leaps. National courts required to determine questions of international law must ...look
at a process that is world-wide and includes the actions and determinations of foreign actors (including foreign courts).
Determinations by United States courts are also part of the process.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,at 19. Professor McDougal's description of the process

of

international law formation, set forth in part in text, infra at note 26, is quoted in reporters' note 2
to § 102. There is no reference to international law as a process either in the black letter of §§
101-103 or in the comments to those sections.
25. McDougal, The Impact of InternationalLaw Upon National Law: A Policy-OrientedPerspective, 4 S. DAK. L. REV. 25, 36 (1959), reprinted in M. Mcl3OUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 157, 170 (1960) (emphasis in original).
26. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the InternationalLaw of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L
L. 356, 356-57 (1955). This passage is partially quoted in RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,
§ 102 reporters' note 2, at 32. See also Falk, supra note 8, at 442.
VOL. 25, NO. 2
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A perusal of the Restatement (Third) indicates that in many cases this pattern was
not followed. The emphasis-in terms of length and detail of discussion-seems
to have shifted from the Comments to the Reporters' Notes, and the Comments
are devoid of illustrations. The ALl offers no explanation for this apparent
departure. Whether it is due to preferences of the reporters for this particular
Restatement or to a decision by the ALI concerning the form of Restatements
generally, the rather sharp contrast with the previous Restatement leaves the
reader wondering about the considerations that motivated these changes. Any
difference that exists in this respect may seem innocuous. But illustrations of the
ways in which often abstract rules would apply to concrete fact situations would
doubtless have been of assistance to nonspecialist members of the American
bench and bar. Furthermore, the ALl takes no responsibility for what appears in
the Reporters' Notes. 27 The controversy surrounding a number of the provisions
of the Restatement (Third)28 suggests the possibility that material that once
appeared either in black letter or Comments may have been moved to Reporters'
Notes. Such a transfer is not improper, but the reader should bear in mind that the
ALl has approved only the material in the Introductory Notes, the black letter,
and the Comments, and not the Reporters' Notes. 29
With these general considerations in mind, let us now turn to sections 102 and
103.
II. Sources of International Law:
Section 102 of the Restatement (Third)
The Restatement (Third) devotes two sections to the subject of "sources" of
international law, lato sensu: section 102 deals with "Sources of International
Law" proper, while section 103 treats "Evidence of International Law." This
distinction between sources and evidence is analytically sound and well accepted:
It is common for writers to distinguish the formal sources and the material sources
of law. The former are those legal procedures and methods for the creation of rules of
general application which are legally binding on the addressees. The material sources
provide evidence of the existence of rules which, when proved, have the status of
legally binding rules of general application. In systems of municipal law the concept of
formal source refers to the constitutional machinery of law-making and the status of the
rule is established by constitutional law .... 30
27. "The Introductory Notes, the rules of law in blackletter type, and the Comments express the
views of the Institute. . . . The Reporters' Notes, on the other hand, reflect the views of the Reporters and describe the legal sources that they have considered relevant." RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 1, at XI.
28. See ALl PROCEEDINGS, supra note 3, at 90-91, 93.

29. This caveat is not meant in any way to depreciate the value of the Reporters' Notes. They
contain a wealth of useful information and references and are backed by the standing of the Reporters
themselves, which is considerable.
30. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW I (3d ed. 1979).
SUMMER 1991
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Or, as the Restatement (Third) explains, "[s]ection 102 sets forth the 'sources'
of international law, i.e., the ways in which a rule or principle becomes international law. [Section 103] indicates the means of proving, for example, in a
court or other tribunal, that a rule has become international law by way of one
31
or more of the sources indicated in § 102.'
Section 102 consists of four paragraphs. 32 Paragraph (1) identifies in summary
fashion the three principal sources of international law, while paragraphs (2)
through (4) elaborate on each of those sources. The treatment of sources is
traditional, closely following the classical listing in article 38(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. 33 The formulations are generally clear and, in

31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,§ 103 comment a.
32. (1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the international
community of states
(a) in the form of customary law;
(b) by international agreement; or
(c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the
world.
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the
creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.
(4) General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or
reflected in customary law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate.
Id. § 102.
33. 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice annexed to the Charter of the United
Nations, art. 38, para. 1,59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute]. Subparagraph d concerns evidence of international law, which is dealt with in
§ 103 of the Restatement (Third).
Other possible sources that might have been mentioned, at least in Comments or
Reporters' Notes, but are not, include unilateral acts or declarations and decisions of
certain international tribunals. Concerning the former, see, e.g., the Nuclear Tests Cases
(Austl. & N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 & 457; Fiedler, UnilateralActs in International
Law, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 517 (1984); Rubin, The In-

ternationalLegal Effects of UnilateralDeclarations,71 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1977); and
Virally, supra note 21, at 154 ("Article 38 ...does not list unilateral acts of states
among the sources of law it enumerates. But this does not mean that such acts cannot
give rise to international rules of law."). With regard to the latter, certain decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights are binding on the parties to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov.
VOL. 25, NO. 2
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some cases, even improve upon those of article 38. 34 The explanations if paragraphs (2) through (4) further assist the reader in understanding the nature of the
individual sources.
One aspect of paragraph (1) of § 102 of the Restatement (Third) is somewhat
puzzling, however. The introductory clause, or "chapeau," of that paragraph
provides that "[a] rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such
by the internationalcommunity of states. . . .',3 The paragraph goes on to list
customary law, international agreement, and general principles of law as means
by which the international community accepts a rule. The question this language
raises is whether all rules of international law must be "accepted as such" by the
entire international community. 36 For example, is a provision of a bilateral or
plurilateral treaty less binding because it is not "accepted" by the international
community? A negative answer to this question is reinforced by the statement in
paragraph (3) of section 102 that "[i]nternational agreements create law for the
states parties thereto . . . ." The formulation of the chapeau also raises questions about how section 102 takes into account regional custom. 3 7 The Comments to that section leave no doubt that the ALI intended to include regional or
special custom within section 102,38 but do not explain how it fits within the
opening clause of paragraph (1).
Paragraph (3) of section 102 deals with international agreements. Its first
clause is straightforward and unproblematic, but one wonders whether it was
advisable to include the balance of the paragraph-stating that agreements "may
lead to the creation of customary law"-in black letter. While there is no doubt

1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; and the same is true of certain decisions of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities (EC) as to EC Member States.
34. In particular, the formulation of paragraph (1)(b) of article 38, which refers to "intemational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law," has been criticized as being
backwards, "since it is the practice which is evidence of the emergence of a custom." L. HENKIN,
R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN].
The references to customary international law in paragraphs (l)(a) and (2) of § 102 are more
straightforward. See supra note 32. Section 102's treatment of "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" (ICJ Statute, supra note 33, art. 38 (1)(c)) is also preferable to the
Statute's formulation since, by referring to "legal systems," it more nearly conveys the idea that
the principles in question are those of municipal or domestic law, rather than general principles of
intemational law recognized by civilized nations. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, §
102 comment I.
35.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102(l) (emphasis added).

36. The language in question could be interpreted to mean "not rejected by the international
community," in the sense that the "rule" would not contravene a norm of jus cogens, but this seems
farfetched.
37. The possibility that regional customary law may exist was implicitly recognized by the
International Court of Justice in the Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266. With regard to
"special custom," see Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Merits), (Port. v.
India), 1960 I.C.J. 6. " '[R]egional,' 'special,' or 'particular' customary law" is addressed in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102 comment e.
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102 comment e.
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about the proposition per se, 3 9 lumping it together with the paragraph on international agreements may cause some confusion in the mind of the uninitiated
reader. 4° There is often an understandable temptation, which should not be
encouraged, to oversimplify the search for rules of customary law by giving
undue weight to treaties as evidence of custom without regard to other forms of
evidence. As the late Judge Baxter has written,
Rules found in treaties can never be conclusive evidence of customary international
law ....
The law-creating multilateral treaty is received as evidence of the law only
when States not parties adopt it in their own practice ....

Each one of these treaties

or series of treaties must be weighed in the balance with other evidence of customary
international law before the true rule of international law may be ascertained. Treaties
will have varying weight vis-h-vis4 1the rest of the evidence of the law in each instance
in which resort is made to them.

The relationship and interaction between treaties and custom is thus a complex
subject 42 that would seem more suitable for careful explanation in the commentary than concise treatment in black letter. The Restatement (Third) touches upon
the subject in at least four places: the Introduction to Part 1;4 3 paragraph (3) of
section 102; comment i to section 102; and reporters' note 5 to section 102. The
relevant portion of the Introduction emphasizes the continued importance of
custom; comment i devotes three sentences to the subject, one of which may be
misleading;an and reporters' note 5 quotes from the North Sea ContinentalShelf
Cases and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is debatable whether
a subject that is introduced so prominently in black letter, and is inherently so
complex, has been dealt with adequately in the supporting material for the
purposes of the nonspecialist.
The treatment of another aspect of the influence of treaties on the development
of custom merits brief mention. Comment i to section 102 includes the following
39. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 71.
40. It would seem to have been more logical to deal with the influence of treaties on the
formation of custom in paragraph (2), which concerns custom, or better still, in the comments to that
paragraph.
41. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURs 25, 99 (1970-I). Professor Anthony
D'Amato would give greater weight to treaties as components of the state practice that contributes to
customary international law. See, e.g., A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 152-60 (1971).

42. See generally id. See also, e.g., Weisburd, Customary InternationalLaw: The Problem of
Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1988); and the colloquy between Professors D'Amato and
Weisburd in 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L., No. 3 (1988).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, at 18.

44. The sentence in question reads: "Some multilateral agreements may come to be law for
non-parties that do not actively dissent." Id. § 102 comment i. It would not be the agreement itself
that would "come to be law for non-parties," of course, but the rule reflected therein. See also
Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, quoted in reporters' note 5: "Nothing
in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State
as a customary rule of internationallaw, recognized as such." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 38, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), 63 A.JI.L. 875 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969)
(emphasis added).
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sentence: "A wide network of similar bilateral arrangements on a subject may
constitute practice and also result in customary law." While this statement is
supported by respectable authority, 45 it is not uncontroversial. 46 Some indications of the circumstances in which such a group of treaties would be likely to
contribute to the formation of customary law would have been helpful.
Peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) are dealt with in comment
k to section 102 and reporters' note 6. Comment k explains that "[t]hese rules
prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them." 47 While it has been enshrined in no less an
authority than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,4 8 the concept ofjus
cogens remains controversial. 4 9 Further, "more authority exists for the category
of jus cogens than exists for its particular content . . . "50 and the Reporters
admit as much. 51 Uncritical acceptance of so powerful, yet vague, a doctrine,
without examining its basis in state practice, may prove somewhat deceptive to
the American legal community.
Other than "principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of
force," 52 the only examples of such possible norms that are offered are found in
the Reporters' Notes,53 for which the ALl is not responsible. 54 Even the example
45. See, e.g., I G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1940); L. HENKIN, supra
note 34, at 87; C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (2d ed. 1945); Hayton, The Formation of the
Customary Rules of InternationalDrainage Basin Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS 834, 868-71 (A. Garretson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead eds. 1967).
46. For example, a similar statement in a report of the special rapporteur of the International Law
Commission on International Watercourses elicited a mixed response in the Commission. See 1989
I.L.C. REP. 346. For cases rejecting the rise of bilateral agreements as evidence of custom, see the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3; and the Barcelona Traction Case, [1970]
I.C.J. Rep. 3.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102 comment k.
48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 44, art. 53.
49. See, e.g., G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 425-27 (3d ed. 1957); Schwarzenberger, InternationalJus Cogens?, 43 Tx. L. REV. 455 (1965). Brownlie notes that the Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States,
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 24 Oct. 1970, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXXV 1970), "makes
no reference to peremptory norms." I. BROWNLIE, supra note 30, at 515 n. 1.
50. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 30, at 515. One commentator has observed that "the beauty of a
general . . . formula of international jus cogens is that it leaves everybody absolutely free to argue
for or against the jus cogens character of any particular rule of international law." Schwarzenberger,
supra note 49, at 477 (footnote omitted).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102 reporters' note 6.
52. Id. § 102 comment k. The mention of even this one example in the commentary is an
improvement over the original draft, which contained no examples either in the Comments or in the
Reporters' Notes. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 102 comment k & reporters' note 6 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) [hereinafter Tent. Draft No.
1].
53. Other than the principles of the Charter prohibiting the use of force, the only examples given
in reporters' note 6 are contained in the following: "It has been suggested that norms that create
'international crimes' and obligate all states to proceed against violations are also peremptory ...
Such norms might include rules prohibiting genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid and other
gross violations of human rights, and perhaps attacks on diplomats." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
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just mentioned could be challenged, in view of the failure of the international
community to reject, unequivocally, interpretations of certain instruments that
would place them in direct contravention of Charter principles prohibiting the use
of force. The Treaty of Guarantee concerning Cyprus 55 is such an instrument.
Article IV(2) of the Treaty of Guarantee could be interpreted to confer upon each
of the guaranteeing powers a unilateral right of intervention. According to that
provision, "each of the three guaranteeing Powers [Greece, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom] reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty. ' 56 During the
Cyprus crisis of 1963-64, the United Kingdom interpreted article IV(2) as
conferring "[a] right of intervention [for the purpose of re-establishing the state
of affairs], and for this purpose alone ... ."57 The Greek representative gave an
unambiguous response to the precise question whether "this article gives
[Greece] the right to intervene militarily and unilaterally without the authorization of the Security Council. The answer is 'no.' ",58 The Foreign Minister of
Cyprus stated that "Turkey . . . appears to interpret [the Treaty] as giving to it
the right of unilateral military intervention [and declared that] [i]t is quite clear
that Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee as interpreted by Turkey 59 is contrary

note 1, § 102 reporters' note 6 (emphasis added). This statement is properly cautious, but its very
tentativeness hardly lends strong support to the unqualified acceptance of this category of norms in
the commentary. Furthermore, the concept of international crimes of states is itself a highly controversial one, and it is here used as a basis for identifying norms of jus cogens without explaining its
meaning or derivation. The Reporters merely invite the curious reader to "compare" a report of the
International Law Commission that deals with the subject. Id.
54. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
55. Treaty of Guarantee, 16 Aug. 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 3. See also Treaty Concerning the
Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, 16 Aug. 1960, 382 U.N.T.S. 8 in which the same four
parties (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) agreed to the independence of Cyprus.
I am indebted to my colleague, Prof. Dr. Henn-Jtiri Uibopuu of the University of Salzburg Law
Faculty, for pointing out to me the apparent inconsistency of the Cyprus treaties (and, in particular,
article IV, para. 2, of the Treaty of Guarantee) with the idea that an agreement authorizing the use of
force against a third state would violate a norm ofjus cogens. Arguably, Cyprus, a party to the Treaty
of Guarantee, consented to a prospective intervention, thus eliminating the problem. But the circumstances surrounding the independence of Cyprus blunt such an argument. On those circumstances, see generally 2 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
1234-42 (1969) [hereinafter A. CHAYES]; T. EHRLICH, CYPRUS 1958-1967 (1974). See also the
interpretations of the relevant provision of the Treaty of Guarantee by the United Kingdom and
Cyprus, set forth infra, which would avoid a conflict with the relevant provisions of the Charter. On
"Guarantee Treaties," see Ress, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (1984).
56. Treaty of Guarantee, supra note 55, art. IV, para. 2.
57. 19 U.N. SCOR (1098th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1098 (1964).
58. 19 U.N. SCOR (1097th mtg.) at 32, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1097 (1964).
59. "In Ankara, officials began to talk about unilateral intervention by Turkey on the basis of the
Treaty of Guarantee." A. CHAYES, supra note 55, at 1244. The United Kingdom, on the other hand,
took the view that "the guarantor powers would be acting as a 'regional arrangement' established
under the Treaty of Guarantee and authorized by Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter." Id.
(citing 688 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 530-31 (1964). (Author's footnote.)
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to peremptory norms of international law, jus cogens .
"60 The6 United Nations Security Council, however, took no position on the question. '
Resolutions of international organizations, and in particular of the United
Nations General Assembly, are not listed in section 102 of the Restatement
(Third) as separate sources of international law, nor should they be. However,
"[b]inding resolutions of international organizations"-i.e., those that are binding by virtue of the treaty forming the organization -are properly characterized
in comment g as "secondary sources" of international law for the members of
the organization in question. 62 Curiously, other kinds of resolutions are the
subject of rather extensive discussion in the Reporters' Notes to section 102,
even though section 103 (Evidence of International Law) also deals with them.
The latter section would seem to be the proper place to consider United Nations
resolutions, since they are not "sources" of international law strictly speaking,
but at most are "evidence of what the states voting for [a declaratory resolution]
regard the law to be. ' 6 3 To be sure, the practice of states in international organizations, as manifested through their statements and in some cases their votes,
is relevant to the formation of custom. It is questionable, however, whether this
form of state practice should be singled out for special treatment in the Reporters' Notes to section 102, particularly when it is so easy to confuse the assessment of state behavior, which may contribute to the formation of a new rule of
64
customary law, with the value of a resolution as evidence of an existing rule.
Reporters' Note 2 to section 102, which contains the discussion of nonbinding
resolutions, bears the heading "Customary law." In Tentative Draft No. 1 of
what is now the Restatement (Third), there was a separate Reporters' Note to
section 102, headed "Resolutions of international organizations," which contained substantially the same material concerning resolutions as now appears in

60. 19 U.N. SCOR (1098th mtg.) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1098 (1964). He went on, however,
to argue that the treaty should be interpreted so as to be consistent with the U.N. Charter, referring,
in particular, to articles 103 and 2(4) of the latter instrument.
61. See Resolution Concerning the Situation in Cyprus, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1964)
at 102-03, U.N. Doc. S/5575 (1964). The Council merely "considered" the positions taken by the
parties to the Treaty of Guarantee and called upon all Member States "to refrain from any action or
threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger
international peace .... "Id. at 103, para. 1. The resolution went on to recommend the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus - the first such recommendation adopted by
all five permanent members of the Security Council. Id. at 103, para. 4.
62. RESTATEMENT (THID), supra note 1, § 102 comment g. To qualify as such a "binding
resolution," the instrument must be adopted pursuant to a provision of the constituent agreement of
the organization conferring power upon it to impose binding obligations on its members. In becoming
parties to such an agreement, states agree to be bound by these resolutions. The "source" of the
obligation is thus the international agreement, not the resolution, per se. Certain provisions of the
U.N. Charter, such as article 17 and chapter VII, have this character.
63. Id. § 103 comment c.
64. The passage from reporters' note 2 to § 102, quoted in note 68 infra, contributes to this
confusion.
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Note 2.65 The editorial changes to the text and the removal of the heading may
have been an attempt to placate those who had criticized the prominence accorded
resolutions in the section of Tentative Draft No. 1 concerning sources of international law. Whatever motivated the changes, the final version's treatment of
resolutions is potentially misleading, 66 and is now buried in a Reporters' Note that
is nearly three pages long. This is unfortunate in view of the heated controversy
that surrounds the subject of the legal effect of U.N. resolutions.67 If the subject
were to be covered at all in connection with section 102, it would have been more
helpful to the reader if the discussion had been placed under a descriptive heading,
such as "State practice in or through international organizations." It is the behavior of states, through their statements and votes, not the resolutions per se, that
is relevant and that is actually addressed in the Reporters' Note. Finally, the
discussion of General Assembly resolutions in Reporters' Note 2 would have been
more useful if it had contained a more detailed treatment of the various factors
bearing upon the effect of the forms of state behavior involved. 68
III. Evidence of International Law:

Section 103 of the Restatement (Third)
The Restatement (Third)'s coverage of evidence of international law6 9 has
undergone a considerable transformation since its first iteration in Tentative Draft
65. Tent. Draft No. 1, supra note 52, § 102, reporters' note 3.
66. The discussion of resolutions in reporters' note 2 to § 102 is potentially misleading
because, as previously stated, it is placed in the context of the sources, rather than of the evidence
of international law. Even declaratory resolutions "on which the generality of the States has
expressed agreement [are not sources of international law; they] proclaim rules recognized by the
community of nations [and] do not create a custom but confirm one ....
Texaco Overseas
Petroleum v. Libyan Arab Republic, Award of Jan. 19, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 1, para. 87 (1978)
[hereinafter TOPCO Arbitration]., Stated another way, they "do not create the law; they have a
declaratory nature of noting what does exist." Castefieda, Valeur Juridique des Risolutions des
Nations Unies, 129 RECUEIL DES Couxs 204, 315 (1970) (translation from 17 I.L.M., supra).
67. See generally the helpful bibliography on the subject of the effect of General Assembly
Resolutions, providing "a broad sampling of opinion," in Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions
Revisited (Forty Years Later), 1987 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 39, 142 (1988).
68. Six different factors are listed in reporters' note 2, but they are not explained or
discussed. The list is preceded by the statement that "[t]he contributions of such resolutions
and of the statements and votes supporting them to the lawmaking process will differ widely,
depending on factors such as [those listed]." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102 reporters'
note 2, at 31. It would have been helpful if the reporters had provided some illustrations of how the
factors bear upon the extent to which the resolutions, statements, and votes contribute to the
lawmaking process. The reporters could have utilized for this purpose the well-known award of
Professor Rend-Jean Dupuy in the TOPCO Arbitration, supra note 66. See generally the discussion
of "Factors in Determining the Effect of General Assembly Resolutions," in Sloan, supra note 67,
at 125.
69. Section 103 of the Restatement (Third) is entitled "Evidence of International Law," and
provides as follows:
(I) Whether a rule has become international law is determined by evidence appropriate
to the particular source from which that rule is alleged to derive (§ 102).
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No. 1.70 One paragraph with three subparagraphs has become two paragraphs, the
second, containing four subparagraphs. From the standpoints of precision of drafting and usefulness to the practitioner, the final version constitutes a substantial
improvement over the original formulation. Section 103 is of great importance to
any lawyer dealing with public international law, since it specifies "the means of
proving, for example, in a court or other tribunal, that a rule has become
inter'
national law by way of one or more of the sources indicated in § 102. 71
Subsection (1) of section 103 is new. 72 While its full significance may not be
apparent to the nonspecialist without the aid of the commentary, it does state a
fundamental principle that belongs in black letter. The principle is simply that the
best evidence that a rule of law exists is primary evidence that is "appropriate to
the particular source from which that rule is alleged to derive . . . . In the
case of customary law, for example, "the 'best evidence' is proof of state
practice . . . .Law made by international agreement is proved by reference to
the text of the agreement . . . , 74 and so on. Subsection (2) deals with secondary evidence of international
law, which is covered in article 38(1)(d) of the
75
Statute of the ICJ.
Article 38 mentions only two kinds of secondary evidence: "judicial decisions" and writings of "publicists." Section 103 elaborates on the first of these
forms, modernizes the terminology of the second, and adds a third: "pronouncements of states." Section 103's treatment of "judicial decisions" provides welcome precision and constitutes an improvement over article 38. The bare refer-

(2) In determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial weight is
accorded to
(a) judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral tribunals;
(b) judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals;
(c) the writings of scholars;
(d) pronouncements by states that undertake to state a rule of international law, when
such pronouncements are not seriously challenged by other states.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD),

supra note 1,§ 103.

70. The original version of § 103, contained in Tent. Draft No. 1,is also entitled "Evidence of
International Law," and provides as follows:
In determining whether a rule has been accepted as international law in one of the ways indicated
in § 102, substantial weight is accorded to
(a) judgments and opinions of international judicial or arbitral tribunals, and of national judicial
or arbitral tribunals;
(b) resolutions of international organizations;
(c) writings of experts on international law.
Tent. Draft No. 1,supra note 52, § 103.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 103 comment a.
72. Paragraph (1)is in fact a slightly reformulated version of the first sentence of the original
comment a. Tent. Draft No. 1,supra note 52, comment a.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,§ 103(1).
74. Id. comment a.
75. "The Court . . .shall apply . . .judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."
ICJ Statute, supra note 33, art. 38(l)(d).
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ence in article 38 to "judicial decisions" is rather opaque, as it does not specify
whether decisions of international courts or national tribunals or both are intended, and it implies that arbitral awards are excluded. Section 103, however,
makes clear that decisions of both international 76 and national 77 courts are relevant forms of evidence and refers expressly to international "arbitral"
awards. 7 8
Unfortunately, neither the Comments nor the Reporters' Notes explain the
reason for deleting the reference to "national ...arbitral tribunals" that had
appeared in Tentative Draft No. 1.79 One consideration may have been that,
unlike courts, such tribunals are usually not governmental organs. While this
factor would preclude the use of such national arbitral awards as instances of
state practice, there is no obvious reason for excluding published awards by
respected arbitrators or tribunals from the list of forms of evidence.8s The fact
that an arbitral tribunal is a "national" one does not mean that it will not have
to pronounce itself on questions of international law that may be involved in the
arbitration. Although awards of such tribunals may not be entitled to as much
weight as those of international courts and tribunals, this should not, by itself,
exclude national tribunals from the list; section8 1 102 does not state that the items
listed in subsection (2) are weighted equally.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of section 103 as originally drafted was
its treatment of resolutions of international organizations. Tentative Draft No. I
provided in section 103(b) that "substantial weight" be accorded, inter alia, to
"resolutions of international organizations." This type of evidence was listed
along with decisions of international courts and tribunals (section 103(a)) and
writings of experts (section 103(c)). Since the term "resolutions" was not qualified, section 103(b) could have been interpreted to apply to all kinds of resolutions. The same could be said of the expression "international organizations."
The commentary was of some assistance, explaining that "§ 103 addresses the
weight to be given to a resolution purporting to declare what the law is." '8 2 But

76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,§ 103(2)(a).

77. Id. § 103(2)(b).
78. Id. § 103(2)(a).
79. Tent. Draft No. 1,supra note 52, § 103(a).
80. "Subsection (2) refers to secondary evidence indicating what the law has been found to be
by authoritative reporters and interpreters .... RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,§ 103
comment a (emphasis added). Among other factors taken into consideration in selecting an arbitrator
would certainly be his or her impartiality and expertise. "The views of national courts . . . generally
have the weight due to bodies of presumed independence, competence, impartiality, and authority."
Id. comment b. There is no apparent reason why a national arbitral tribunal could not qualify as such
a body.
81. "[T]he order of the clauses is not meant to indicate their relative importance." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 1, § 103 comment a (referring to subsection (2)). Still, it would be difficult to
prove empirically that judgments of the ICJ, for example, are accorded less weight than other forms
of evidence listed.
82. Tent. Draft No. 1,supra note 52, § 103 comment c.
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would a declaratory resolution of the International Tin Council, the OECD, or
even UNESCO be entitled to the same weight as one adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly? The commentary offered no assistance on this point. Finally,
some critics charged that Tentative Draft No. 1 gave too much prominence to
resolutions of international organizations. 83 After all, such resolutions are not
even mentioned in article 38 of the World Court's Statute, and as already noted,
their legal effect has been the subject of intense controversy. To what extent does
the Restatement (Third) respond to these concerns?
The redrafting of section 103 has resulted in a number of improvements in the
Restatement (Third)'s treatment of resolutions. First, the term "resolutions" no
longer appears in black letter. In its place is the term "pronouncements of
states." This is more than a cosmetic change, since it places emphasis on what
motivated the state behavior (for example, a statement or vote in the General
Assembly) in question. Second, the kinds of "pronouncements of states" that
may be accorded "substantial weight" are carefully qualified: they must "undertake to state a rule of international law" and they must not be "seriously
challenged by other states." Finally, the subject is now dealt with last, according
pride of place (if not priority in a hierarchical sense 84) to decisions and scholarly
writings.
The final version of section 103 of the Restatement (Third) still raises a
number of questions, however: Why was the expression "pronouncements of
states" chosen? Does it refer to both individual and joint "pronouncements"? If
the expression is restricted to or includes individual pronouncements, can such
statements be both a "source" of international law under section 102 and "evidence" thereof under section 103?85 Would the expression include individual
pronouncements made outside the context of resolutions, for example, in diplomatic notes? Would not individual pronouncements constitute evidence of the
practice of the State in question, even if "seriously challenged"? If the expression includes joint pronouncements, as comment c to section 103 indicates, may
these take some form other than "[d]eclaratory resolutions of international organizations"? 86 What is the import of the clause, "when such pronouncements
are not seriously challenged by other states"? Would a "pronouncement" be due
"substantial weight" when the states it would principally affect abstain from
83. Cf., e.g., Comments of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 2, para. 2 (May
12, 1982) (on file with the author) stating "[t]he draft does not, in our view, adequately weigh the
sources of international law. In particular, it accords too much authority to resolutions of the General
Assembly of the United Nations."
84. The clauses are not necessarily listed in order of importance. See supra note 81.
85. For example, the "Truman Proclamation" of Sept. 28, 1945, declaring sovereign rights in
the continental shelf, was not "seriously challenged by other states" and indeed gained general
acceptance within a short time. It is not clear whether the Proclamation should be regarded as a
"source" or as "evidence" of international law under the Restatement's approach.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 103 comment c. (The quoted phrase is the heading
of comment c.)
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supporting (voting for) it? Does it make any difference which "other states"
seriously challenge the pronouncement?8 7
The Comments to section 103 do not directly answer any of these questions;
the Reporters' Notes, while containing much fuller explanations than the Comments, address only the last three. However, the evolution of the black letter, as
well as the manner in which the Comments and Reporters' Notes are structured, 88 suggest rather strongly that the ALl had declaratory resolutions of international organizations, and particularly those of the U.N. General Assembly,
foremost in mind when it adopted subsection (2)(d). Assuming this to be the
case, the next question is whether the Restatement (Third) is correct in stating
that "substantial weight is accorded to" such resolutions, when they "are not
89
seriously challenged by other states"?
As previously noted, the subject of the legal effect of General Assembly
resolutions, even declaratory ones, is highly controversial. 90 This suggests that
if such resolutions are to be mentioned at all in black letter, even by implication,
they should be treated with extreme care. The Restatement (Third) comes close
to this standard, but more precision would have been helpful. The Comment
pertaining to subsection (2)(d) states as follows: "International organizations
generally have no authority to make law, and their determinations of law ordinarily have no special weight, but their declaratory pronouncements provide
some evidence of what the states voting for it [sic] regard the law to be." 9' This
passage embodies an approach to the question of the effect of declarations that
appears opposite to that taken in black letter: it suggests that the general rule is
that the "determinations of law" by international organizations "ordinarily have
no special weight," and that "declaratory pronouncements" may constitute an

87. For example, it is conceivable that, for political or other reasons, a landlocked state could
challenge a declaratory resolution concerning maritime zones; or that an island state could challenge
a resolution concerning the law of international watercourses. Such challenges would presumably not
significantly affect the authoritative value of the resolutions, since the challenging states would not
be among those "principally affected." Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 102 reporters'
note 2, noting that factors to be considered in evaluating the contribution of a particular resolution
to the lawmaking process include "how numerous and important are the dissenting states, [and]
whether it is widely supported (including in particular the states principally affected) ....
"
88. Of a total of three separate Comments to § 103, the only one bearing at all upon subsection
(2)(d) is comment c, entitled "Declaratory resolutions of international organizations." That Comment begins with the following sentence: "States often pronounce their views on points of international law, sometimes jointly through resolutions of international organizations that undertake to
declare what the law is on a particular question ....
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 103
comment c. Similarly, there are two Reporters' Notes to § 103. The first is headed "Writings of
international law scholars," and the second, "Declaratory resolutions of international organizations." There is no Comment or Reporters' Note dealing with any other kind of "pronouncement."
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 103 comment c. This is the second of the two criteria
contained in subsection (2)(d). The first, that the pronouncement "undertake to state a rule of
international law," refers to the "declaratory" nature of the resolution. Id. § 103(2)(d).
90. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 103 comment c.
VOL. 25, NO. 2

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

329

exception to this general rule, at least insofar as they indicate what the states
voting for the resolution regard the law to be. Even those pronouncements,
however, only "provide some evidence" of the law and "[t]he evidentiary value
of such resolutions is variable." 92 The black letter rule, on the other hand, leaves
the impression that the general rule is that declaratory resolutions are ordinarily
entitled to substantial weight, provided only that they are not seriously challenged by certain states.
The Reporters' Notes are even clearer than the Comments on the effect of
declarations. They further qualify the above passage by explaining that a declaratory resolution "is some evidence of what the states voting for the resolution
regard the law to be, although what states do is more weighty evidence than their
declarations or the resolutions they vote for." 93 The Reporters' Notes recognize
that, while U.N. resolutions adopted unanimously or by consensus have a high
evidentiary value, "[e]ven a unanimous resolution may be questioned when the
record shows that those voting for it considered it merely a recommendation or
a political expression ...."94 Apparently, resolutions adopted by a less than
unanimous vote should be scrutinized especially closely. The Reporters' Notes
confirm this conclusion: "majorities may be tempted to declare as existing law
what they would like the law to be, and less weight must be given to such a
resolution when it declares law in the interest of the majority and against the
' 95
interest of a strongly dissenting minority.
These explanations are all most helpful because they emphasize the importance of carefully assessing the authoritative value of each individual resolution,
taking into account the kinds of factors mentioned.96 This detailed treatment
contrasts with the relatively broad brushstrokes of the black letter, and even of

92. Id.
93. Id. reporters' note 2. That Reporters' Note contains the following further qualifications: "A
resolution is entitled to little weight if it is contradicted by state practice .. .or is rejected by
international courts or tribunals." Id. A memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat, quoted (apparently with approval) in the Reporters' Notes to § 102, takes the
opposite approach. It states that a declaration "may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ
adopting it, a strong expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it.
Consequently, insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by
custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 1, § 102 reporters' note 2 (quoting U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610) (emphasis added). In other words,
while reporters' note 2 to § 103 suggests that certain declaratory resolutions would be accorded
substantial weight unless they are contradicted by state practice, the memorandum appears to state
that a declaration isentitled to weight only if it is supported by state practice.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1,§ 103 reporters' note 2.
95. Id.
96. See also the similar list of factors set forth in reporters' note 2 to § 102, and especially the
analysis of the legal effect of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. A/5344/Add. 1, (XVII 1962), 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963)
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. Doc. A19946,
(XXIX 1974), 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975), respectively, by Prof. Rend-Jean Dupuy, the sole arbitrator in
the TOPCO Arbitration, supra note 66.
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the commentary. It is somewhat troublesome that of the three components of
section 103 (black letter, Comments, and Reporters' Notes), the most accurate
"restatement" of the effect of declaratory resolutions of international organizations is thus contained in the one component for which the ALl bears no responsibility. One can only hope that those referring to the Restatement (Third) will
read as far as the Reporters' Notes (those used to Restatements of other subjects
might justifiably assume that any important explanations would be contained in
the Comments 97) and will interpret the black letter in light of the explanations the
notes contain.
IV. Conclusion
Has the ALI accomplished its purpose of providing guidance to the average
lawyer on the subject of sources of international law? 9 8 The answer, on balance,
is in the affirmative. The Restatement (Third) renders assistance to the American
bench and bar by elucidating, in two sections with supporting commentary, the
rather esoteric doctrines of the sources and evidence of international law. In this
respect the ALl has improved considerably upon the previous Restatement,
which did not devote a single section to sources. The various questions raised in
this article, however, suggest that the Restatement (Third)'s treatment of sources
and evidence, while generally sound, should be utilized with care.
Difficult and complex subjects, such as the relationship between treaties and
custom, peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens), and the legal effect
of U.N. resolutions, are perhaps not well-suited to the kind of concise coverage
that is required in a Restatement. This is especially true in view of the American
legal community's relative lack of familiarity with public international law, as
compared with subjects treated in other Restatements. The ALL courageously
tackles these difficult topics, and on the whole, presents them usefully. But the
practitioner or judge having recourse to the Restatement (Third)-and, in particular, to the material on sources and evidence of international law-should be
aware of the debates raging about many of the subjects with which it deals and
should read the relevant sections with corresponding circumspection. Reporters'
Notes, whole not adopted by the ALl, contain excellent discussions and explanations of the rules in black letter, which, curiously, are usually more helpful than
those in the Comments. They therefore merit the close attention of the reader.
' 99
It has been said that Restatements have "a useful life of one generation.
Given the cataclysmic changes sweeping many parts of the world today, this may
prove to be an optimistic assessment in the case of the new Foreign Relations
Restatement. But for the time being at least, the Restatement (Third) will, when
used advisedly, serve as a convenient reference work for the American lawyer.
97. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
99. Falk, supra note 8, at 441.
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